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1. Introduction
Social security is in trouble. With declining  population  growth  and  rising
life-expectancy, the cost of social security benefits is rising relative to
payroll  tax  revenues.  As  result,  the  social  security  retirement  fund  is
expected to run out around 2030.1 Recently, the  Advisory  Council  on  Social
Security  (1997)  proposed  three  different  plans  to  address  the  problem.
Interestingly, all three plans involve an social security investments in the
stock market. This paper  examines  the  impact  of  social  security  reform  on
financial markets, commenting specifically on the Advisory Council’s proposals
and more generally on the question of how to operate social security under
uncertainty and under adverse demographic conditions.
The effects of social security on financial markets have long been the
subject of debate among economists. The debate has generally focused on issues
of       intergenerational             redistribution      ,  using  deterministic  or  certainty-
equivalent economic models and taking for granted  that  government  debt  and
social security trust funds involve essentially safe securities. The thrust of
this literature is that social security reduces individual savings incentives,
raises interest rates, and crowds out investment. The debate is about how much
and under what conditions.
The  Advisory  Council  proposals  about  equity  investments  raise
significant  new  questions  about  the  workings  of  social  security  under
uncertainty.  These  questions  are  fundamentally  about  the  allocation  of
macroeconomic  risks  between  generations,  about       intergenerational             risk-     
     sharing      .2 This is an important issue because almost all policies affecting the
                        
1 The gap between Medicare costs and revenues is even worse. Though this paper focuses on
retirement  funding,  the  conceptual  points  about  intergenerational  risk  sharing  and
intergenerational redistribution apply analogously to medical and disability funding.
2 The literature in this area is much more limited. See Gale (1990), Bohn (1997), and the
references therein.2
intergenerational  distribution  of  resources  also  have  an  impact  on  the
allocation of risk and because risk and insurance are economically valuable.
An analysis of redistributional policies is therefore incomplete without an
assessment  of  the  risk  sharing  implications.  From  this  perspective,  the
Advisory Council has done us a favor in presenting proposals with such blatant
risk-shifting implications that the issue cannot be avoided.
Social security reform therefore raises two key macroeconomic questions.
First, the distributional question: How does a  certain  proposal  affect  the
expected cash-flows between different generations and the government? Second,
the risk-sharing question: Which generation is responsible for the shortfall
(or  receives  a  windfall)  if  the  financing  does  not  work  out  according  to
expectations?3 These twin questions cannot be answered separately. On the one
hand,  the  allocation  of  risk  occurs       relative        to  the  underlying  expected
distributional positions, making it difficult to examine risk sharing without
also considering redistribution. On the other hand, policy plans rarely work
out as expected, making it dangerous to neglect the allocation of risk.
A third question is  about  the  possibility  of  disguised  equivalencies
between alternative policies. Policies that look very different at first sight
and  that  involve  very  different  policy  instruments  may  have  identical
macroeconomic  effects.  A  discussion  of  neutrality  results  simplifies  the
analysis of complex policy plans because it allows one to “strip away” the
neutral components and to focus on the items that matter.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  basic
principles  of  pay-as-you-go  social  security  and  the  Advisory  Council
proposals. Section 3 examines neutrality results, Section  4  the  effects  of
                        
3  The  paper  focuses  on  macroeconomic  issues.  Microeconomic  questions,  e.g.,  about
redistribution across income levels and family structures or  about  the  intra-generational
sharing of mortality risk, are undoubtedly important for social security, but they beyond the
scope of this paper.3
intergenerational  redistribution,  and  Section  5  the  effects  of
intergenerational risk-shifting. Section 6  compares  alternative  policies  in
the  context  of  changing  demographics.  Section  7  concludes.  Many  technical
results are presented in the appendix.
2. Social Security and Demographic Change
2.1. Pay-as-you-go and the No-Free-Lunch Principle
Some  general  comments  about  the  nature  of  social  security  are  appropriate
because the social security reform debate is still plagued by misconceptions
about what reforms are feasible. The basic principle of social security is to
collect a tax from  workers  against  the  promise  of  retirement  benefits.  If
social security taxes were invested by the government and returned to workers
with  interest,  social  security  would  essentially  be  a  system  of  forced
savings. Such a “fully funded” system would likely replace private savings,
but--unless the forcing element  is  binding--have  little  effect  on  national
savings. But if social security operates as a “pay as you go” (PAYG) system in
which worker contributions are immediately transferred to  current  retirees,
the reduction of private  savings  is  not  matched  by  government  savings  and
national savings are likely to decline.4
In 1935, U.S. social security was designed as fully funded system but
soon  converted  into  a  PAYG  system.  Benefits  far  in  excess  of  prior
contributions were granted to the initial generations of beneficiaries (Boskin
et al., 1987). Since 1983, social security has accumulated a  growing  trust
fund (about $450bill. as of Sept.1995). Despite the impressive dollar value of
this fund, it remains small relative to the total obligations of the social
security  system,  which  are  somewhere  between  $3.5  and  $11  trillion  (Bohn,
                        
4 A well-known caveat is that private savings might not fall if individuals increase their
planned bequests (Barro, 1974). I will not reiterate this caveat below because  the  point
should be obvious to readers interested in Ricardian equivalence.4
1992;  Feldstein,  1996).  Hence,  the  U.S.  social  security  system  is  still
largely a PAYG system.
The welfare effects of a PAYG system depend crucially on the relation
between market interest rates, population growth, and wage growth. The cost of
social security benefits relative to payroll (the cost rate) is given by the
average replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to wages) divided by the ratio
of workers to retirees. At a given  payroll  tax  rate,  the  relation  between
retiree  benefits  (a  fraction  of  current  wages)  to  the  retiree’s  past
contributions (a fraction of past wages) is therefore determined by the growth
rate  of  wages  and  the  population  growth  rate  (determining  the  worker-to-
retirees ratio). Except under extreme and practically irrelevant conditions,
the  implied  “return”  on  social  security  contributions  is  below  comparable
market interest rates, making participants worse off than if they had saved
for retirement at market rates. This point has sometimes been disputed with
reference to “dynamic inefficiency,” an extreme scenario in which individuals
are so eager to save that market returns fall below the population plus wage
growth  rate.  But  the  empirical  work  of  Abel  et  al.  (1989)  has  show
convincingly that dynamic inefficiency does not apply to the United States.
The intuition why social security must offer a bad deal to participants
is  simply  the  “no  free  lunch”  principle.  The  first  generation  of  PAYG
beneficiaries  receives  benefits  far  in  excess  of  their  contributions  plus
interest. The below-market returns offered by a mature social security system
are the necessary counterpart to the initial net transfers. The gap between
market returns and the return on social security contributions is in effect a
perpetual tax that is exactly equal to the initial net transfers in present
value terms.5
                        
5 Stiglitz et al. (1997) provide an excellent discussion of this  point.  Feldstein  (1995)
makes a convoluted argument against this equality,  treating  the  discount  rate  as  a  free5
The size of this inherited burden is currently obscured by the federal
government’s  misleading  accounting  methods.  In  the  Social  Security
Administration’s publications, expected receipts from      future       generations are
counted as offsets against  the  cost  of  benefit  payments  to       current        social
security participants, without acknowledging that such receipts would generate
new obligations.6 Such accounting would be considered fraudulent if used by
any private entity. If one treats the net present value of future payments to
current participants as a liability, the estimated  obligations  of  the  U.S.
social security system are staggering. According to my own very conservative
estimates, just the obligations to current retirees are $3.5 trillion as of
1990  (Bohn  1992).  Using  different  assumptions,  Feldstein  (1996)  obtains
estimated liabilities as high as $11 trillion. It would be a real contribution
to the reform debate if the federal government were willing to recognize and
officially quantify these liabilities.
Both the inevitability of below-market returns and the notion that we
are  paying  for  transfers  made  in  the  distant  past  have  fundamental
implications for social security reform:
1. One should not be surprised that each new generation is upset about the
inherited burden of the PAYG system. By construction, a PAYG system offers
a below-market returns to current and future  participants.  Hence,  it  is
fundamentally impossible to raise social security’s “money’s worth” ratio
to 100%; and it is misguided to attempt the impossible.7   
                                                                              
parameter instead of applying the usual principle of discounting at market rates.
6 The political rhetoric justifying this accounting is simply incoherent. On the one hand,
social security is praised as a system  worthy  of  universal  political  support  because  it
offers secure benefits “in  exchange”  for  contributions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  promised
benefits are not recognized as government obligations because payroll taxes do not create
liabilities in  the  legal  sense.  This  is  inconsistent.  If  future  receipts  do  not  create
obligations, return and “money’s worth” calculations (as in Advisory Council, 1997; Gramlich,
1996) are meaningless. Moreover, if claims on social security are not government obligations,
the  option  of  abolishing  social  security  overnight  without  compensation  for  past
contributions (putting the old on general welfare) would be fair game in the policy debate.
But if this “option” is considered outrageous--as I think it is--the retirees “entitlement”
to receive social security is in effect a government obligation and should not be denied.
7 The Advisory Council’s claims of success in this  regard  are  misleading.  In  short,  the
Advisory Council assumes that bonds yield an annual real return of 2.3% while stocks yield a6
2.  Since  those  who  received  the  initial  transfers  have  long  died,  it  is
impossible to unwind the system without someone paying the price.  In  an
ongoing  social  security  system,  each  generation  pays  a  fraction  of  the
inherited burden and passes on the remainder to their successors. To end or
“privatize” social security, some generation(s) would have to pay off the
entire burden, either by suffering huge benefits cuts when old or by paying
higher payroll taxes when young without promise of corresponding benefits.
3. In an ongoing social security system, the fraction of the inherited PAYG
burden borne by the current generation depends on the gap between market
interest  rates  and  the  population  plus  productivity  growth  rates.  Not
surprisingly, social security has become more unpopular as U.S. population
growth and (since 1973) productivity growth have declined.
Overall, social security reform is about how to cope with the huge unfunded
claims  created  by  the  existing  PAYG  system.  No  reform  can  realistically
promise to make this inherited burden vanish.  The  real  question  is  how  to
share the burden at a time of adverse demographic developments.
2.2. The Advisory Council’s Proposals
Currently, the combined employer and employee contributions  to  the  Old  Age
Retirement  (OASI)  and  disability  (DI)  funds  amount  to  12.4%  of  covered
payroll. After deducting 1.8% for disability insurance, 10.6% remain for OASI
funding, which is the focus of the Advisory Council proposals. Current social
security  law  provides  for  essentially  constant  tax  rates  and  a  constant
average replacement rate of about 32%.8 At the current ratio of 3.2 worker per
retiree, OASI operates at a surplus (at a cost rate of about 32%/3.2=10%) and
accumulates  a  growing  trust  fund.  But  with  rising  life  expectancy  and
declining population growth, the ratio of workers  to  retirees  will  decline
                                                                              
real return of 7.0%. Expected future trust fund positions and feasible benefits are computed
on this basis. But to calculate present values, all benefits are discounted at a fixed rate
of 2.3%--even the benefits funded by risky stock market investments. Not surprisingly, if a
dollar is accumulated at 7.0% and then discounted at 2.3%, there is an apparent “free lunch”
that allows the Council to claim fictitiously high “money’s worth” ratios.
8 To summarize the financial status of social security, I am using rounded numbers and ignore
some complicating details that would not change the overall assessment.7
sharply, causing a substantial rise in the cost rate. Over the 75 year horizon
used by the social security administration (1996-2070), the average OASI cost
rate is about 12.8%, leaving a 2.2% gap to the 10.6% revenues under current
law.
The  Advisory  Council  report  contains  three  different  proposals.  All
three claim to cover the gap between estimated cost and revenues. The first
proposal, the Maintenance of  Benefits  (MB)  plan,  calls  for  an  increase  in
income taxes on social security benefits, a small reduction in cost of living
adjustments, increased coverage of state and local government employees, an
increase in payroll taxes by 1.6% in 2045, and “consideration” of investing up
to 40% of the social security trust fund in the  stock  market.  Despite  the
cautious  wording,  the  stock  market  investment  is  essential  to  the  plan,
because the plan would be unbalanced without a high rate of return on trust
fund investments. Importantly, the  plan  maintains  a  fixed  benefit  formula,
which  means  that  risk  of  unexpectedly  low  or  high  investment  returns  is
implicitly imposed on future generations of contributors.
The second proposal, the Individual Accounts (IA)  plan,  calls  for  an
immediate increase in worker contributions by 1.6% of payroll to be invested
in “individual accounts” that work like a defined contribution pension plan.
The plan includes the same changes in  the  income  taxation  of  benefits  and
inflation  adjustments  as  the  MB  plan,  it  includes  a  phased-in  changes  in
benefits that reduce traditional defined benefits by 30%, and calls  for  an
accelerated increase in the retirement age. The plan is designed so that the
sum of (reduced) defined benefits plus expected returns on individual accounts
equals the benefit level under current law.
The third proposal, the Personal Security Accounts (PSA) plan, calls for
5% of contributions to be diverted to individual “personal security” accounts,8
a new 1.52% “transitional” tax to be imposed from now to the year 2070, and
the same changes in the income taxation of benefits and inflation adjustments
as the other plans.  After  a  phase-in  period,  defined  benefits  are  reduced
sharply  so  that  retirees  will  have  to  rely  largely  on  their  individual
accounts. The transitional tax is needed because social security will run a
deficit after the 5% diversion until the benefit reductions are phased in. The
shortfall is supposed to be bond financed and the bonds to be retired by 2070
from the transitional tax.
From a generational perspective, the essence of social security is that
the young make contributions and the old receive benefits. Policy changes that
reduce  the  value  of  social  security-related  net  payments  to  retirees  are
therefore best interpreted as benefit reductions (see Proposition 1 below).
This includes increases in the retirement age and the taxation of benefits.
From this perspective, the IA plan is the most straightforward of the three.
Contributions  are  immediately  and  permanently  increased  by  1.6%.  Total
expected benefits are reduced by about 0.8% of payroll (because of increased
taxation, changes in inflation indexation, and changes in retirement age) and
made contingent on the individual account returns.
The PSA plan calls for an immediate tax increase of similar size as the
IA plan (by 1.52% versus 1.6%) and it calls for larger individual accounts,
funded by 5.0% of payroll versus 1.6% under IA. Without itemizing the benefit
changes, the comparison to IA makes clear that the PSA plan must be reducing
the cost of defined benefits by an extra 3.5% (»5%-1.52%). A key difference
between the IA and the PSA plan is the transitional nature of the tax increase
under PSA. After 2070, the IA system continues to collect 12.2% of payroll, of
which  1.6%  go  to  individual  accounts  and  10.6%  to  the  “pooled”  defined
benefits account, while PSA contributions fall back to 10.6% of payroll, of9
which 5% go to individual accounts and only the remaining 5.6% to the defined
benefits pool. The distinction between pooled and individual accounts deserves
special emphasis in this context because the size of the pooled fund turns out
to be critical for evaluating the plans’ effects on interest rates, savings,
and intergenerational redistribution.
The  MB  plan’s  transitional  features  go  in  the  opposite  direction.
Contribution rates are held at the current level until 2045, when they are
raised by 1.6% as under the IA plan. The MB and IA plans therefore call for
equally high contributions in the long run; but under MB, all contributions go
into the defined benefits account. To cover expenses prior to the tax increase
in 2045, the plan relies heavily on high returns from stock market investments
(penciled in for 0.8% of payroll).9
For purposes of intergenerational risk-sharing, a key question is what
will happen if investment returns turn out to be above or below expectations.
Here the IA and PSA plans differs drastically from MB. Under IA and PSA, the
risk of unexpectedly high or low returns is borne by individual participants.
The MB plan is silent about this question. But since the thrust of the plan is
to maintain defined benefits, a reasonable interpretation is that all risks
are  effectively  borne  by  future  generations  of  contributors.  This
interpretation  is  also  consistent  with  the  fact  that  a  tax  increase  is
scheduled  in  2045  when  the  trust  fund  is  exhausted  in  expectation.
                        
9 Two provisions deserve separate comment. First, the IA and PSA plans call for an indexation
of the retirement age to life-expectancy. This is a quite elegant way to eliminate a major
source of cost increases, because without indexation, rising life-expectancy would require
ongoing tinkering with the systems’ tax and benefit provisions. Second, with regard to the
increased coverage of state and local government employees, recall that social security is a
bad deal once the initial generation has collected more in benefits than it  paid  in.  By
including more workers--this time, state and local employees--the inherited burden is shared
among a larger number of participants, cleverly reducing the percentage cost for the existing
participants. This financing trick is not new, of course. Social security has become more and
more inclusive over time.10
Unexpectedly low or high returns would most likely trigger an advancement or
delay in this tax change.10
The following sections will examine the macroeconomic effects of social
security reform in general and the above proposals in particular. Since the
focus is on intergenerational issues, I will use an overlapping generations
model  as  the  conceptual  framework,  following  Samuelson  (1958)  and  Diamond
(1965).  The  objective  is  to  address  three  key  questions:  Which  policies
matter--versus being neutral? Which policies redistribute across generations?
Which  provisions  affect  the  intergenerational  allocation  of  risk?  I  will
address these issues in turn.
3. Neutrality Results
Sometimes, alternative government policies are economically equivalent even if
they  are  presented  in  very  different  ways.  For  smart  individuals,  policy
differences  are  real  only  to  the  extent  that  they  affect  consumption
opportunities.  Equivalent  policies  can  be  identified  by  examining  the  net
cash-flows between the government and individuals. Such an accounting for cash
flows provides several interesting insights about social security reform and
other policy issues:11
     Proposition            1      :       A            higher            tax            on            the            old            is            equivalent            to            a            cut            in            social
     security            benefits      . This equivalence is has been exploited routinely since the
1983  social  security  reform  and  it  is  part  of  all  three  Advisory  Council
                        
10 There may be an asymmetry, however, in that the old may well demand extra payments in case
of unexpectedly high returns, while benefit cuts are less likely in case of low returns. The
MB plan is silent about this issue, too. Under the IA and PSA plans, one may similarly wonder
if the government would come under political pressure to “bail out” the old if the stock
market falls. The distributional implications of such bailouts should  be  obvious.  If  one
seriously suspects that the young would bear most losses while the old participate in the
gains, an options pricing approach would be required to model plans’ impact. This might be an
important topic for future research.
11 Precise statements of the following propositions are presented in  the  appendix  in  the
context of an overlapping generations model; see also Stiglitz (1983).11
proposals. All three plans propose an increased taxation of benefits combined
with an transfer of the tax receipts to the trust fund.
This proposition applies not just to the  taxation  of  social  security
benefits but also to the general tax reform debate. For example, a revenue-
neutral shift from income taxes to consumption taxes is bound to increase the
taxation of retirees who consume but not work. Consumption taxes reduce the
purchasing  power  of  given  social  security  benefits  and  are  therefore
economically equivalent to a benefit reduction.
     Proposition            2:            A            trust            fund            to            pay            for            the            contributors’            own            future            retirement
     has            no            real            effects      . This is because such a trust fund is a virtually perfect
substitute for private savings.  This  neutrality  proposition  is  more  narrow
than Ricardian neutrality (the neutrality of intergenerational redistribution,
which  requires  Barro’s  (1974)  assumptions  about  bequests),  but  similar  to
Stiglitz (1983) result that a shift in the timing of taxes is neutral, if all
tax changes involve the same generation.
An important condition for Proposition 2 is  the  absense  of  liquidity
constraints. With liquidity constraints, a trust fund would increase aggregate
savings  because  constrained  consumers  would  not  be  able  to  reduce  their
private  savings  in  response.  But  by  definition,  liquidity-constrained
consumers discount future income  by  more  than  the  market  interest  rate.  A
trust fund would then      reduce       welfare in this case rather than being neutral.
Hence, liquidity constraints do  not  provide  an  argument  in  favor  of  trust
funds.
Proposition 2 applies directly to the individual accounts proposed by
the  IA  and  PSA  plans.  Since  individuals  receive  the  returns  to  their  own
contributions, the present value  of  benefits  from  individual  accounts  must
equal the value of contributions. Abstracting from liquidity constraints, such12
accounts are irrelevant for macroeconomic analysis. At best, they complicate
government accounting without doing harm. At worst, they serve as vehicle for
accounting gimmicks (e.g., if assumed 7% returns are discounted at 2.3%) and
they may impose forced savings upon liquidity-constrained consumers.
The  forced  savings  issue  raises  some  serious  questions  about  the
philosophy underlying the current social security reform debate. With rational
consumers, forced savings cannot convey welfare benefits,  because  consumers
could  save  on  their  own  if  they  wanted  to.  It  seems  that  some  type  of
paternalistic  argument  is  required  to  rationalize  mandatory  individual
accounts and other proposals that involve forced savings.
     Proposition            3:            A            trust            fund            financed            by            the            young            to            maintain            unchanged            future
     retirement            benefits            is            equivalent            to            a            benefit            reduction      . This is a corollary
to Proposition 2. If benefits are paid  from  a  trust  fund  built  up  by  the
generation receiving the benefits, individuals are financing part of their own
retirement benefits. The macroeconomic effect is as if the trust  fund  were
never created and the benefits reduced accordingly.
This proposition applies to 1983 social security reform and the IA plan.
The 1983 social security reform raised payroll taxes to accumulate  a  trust
fund,  but  without  promising  higher  future  benefits.  The  IA  plan  similarly
promises to maintain unchanged total benefits (at best) but requires a payroll
tax increase.
     Proposition            4:            Trust            fund            investments            in            the            stock            market            are            neutral,            if            and
     only            if            the            old            generation            bears            the            risk            of            stock            price            fluctuations      . This
proposition highlights a key  difference  between  the  three  Advisory  Council
proposals. Under the IA and PSA plans, the proposition is satisfied because
individuals bear the risk of stock price changes in the accounts set up on13
their behalf. Under the Maintenance of Benefits (MB) plan, however, promised
benefits are independent of the trust fund performance. Unless retirees are
subjected to some special tax/transfer scheme contingent on stock returns--
which  is  difficult  to  imagine--the  stock  market  risk  falls  on  future
generations.  Hence,  the  MB  plan  is  not  neutral  with  respect  to
intergenerational risk sharing.
     Proposition            5:            The            issue            of            government            bonds            in            exchange            for            terminating
     social            security            can            be           economically           neutral,           but           only           under           unrealistic
     conditions      .  If  the  last  generation  of  social  security  contributors--the
generation that pays benefits to the old without itself receiving benefits--is
given government bonds with identical payoffs, its consumption opportunities
remain  unchanged.  Similarly,  all  following  generations  are  unaffected  if
government debt is perpetually rolled-over from generation to generation at a
level  equal  to  the  previously  scheduled  social  security  benefits.  Such  a
neutral  scheme  must  satisfy  two  conditions:  First,  to  be  distributionally
neutral, the debt must grow in expectation at the rate of population plus wage
growth.  Second,  in  a  stochastic  setting  with  wage-indexed  social  security
benefits,  the  government  must  issue  wage-indexed  bonds  to  mimic  social
security. Otherwise, the substitution of bonds for social security benefits
has a non-neutral impact on the allocation of risk.
This proposition helps to  explain  why  none  of  the  existing  plans  to
privatize or scale-down social security is neutral. Most plans--including the
PSA proposal and Feldstein’s  (1996)  plan--call  for  traditional  debt  rather
than wage-indexed claims and they call for the debt to be paid off in finite
time. Such plans in  effect  call  for  a  significant  redistribution  from  the
transitional generations that pay off the debt to future generations.12
                        
12  Feldstein  (1995)  argues  that  such  redistribution  is  “welfare-improving.”  This  is14
Three caveats about these propositions are in order. First, the above results
only apply to the comparison of alternative policies that are implemented with
certainty. From a political economy perspective, it is a non-trivial question
which  policy  plans  are  more  or  less  likely  to  be  implemented.  If  an
“entitlement” to social security benefits is somewhat more or less secure that
a claim represented by a Treasury bond, the two would not be equivalent ex
ante  (see  Bohn,  1992).  Second,  liquidity  constraints  are  relevant  for  all
policy changes involving trust funds, as discussed under Proposition 2. Third,
I have ignored the issue of distortionary taxation, on which I will comment
below.
4. Intergenerational Redistribution
Two brief comments on intergenerational redistribution should be sufficient,
because the effects depend mostly on how individual savings respond to changes
in government policy, the topic of another session of this conference.
First, in a standard overlapping generations framework,  any  permanent
policy shift that increases the amount of redistribution from young  to  old
will increase the level of interest rates and put the economy on a growth path
with  lower  per-capita  income.  Increased  redistribution  reduces  workers
disposable income and reduces their need to save for old age. Lower savings
raise the equilibrium interest rate and crowd  out  capital  investment.  This
reasoning  provides  an  immediate  comparison  of  the  three  Advisory  Council
proposals.  In  the  22nd  century--after  all  transitional  provisions  have
expired--payroll taxes for “pooled” defined-benefit accounts are about 12.2%
                                                                              
technically  correct  if  one  measures  welfare  by  the  present  value  of  all  generations’
consumption  and  applies  a  low  enough  social  discount  rate.  But  the  “welfare”  label  is
potentially misleading, because such “welfare” improvements are not Pareto-improvements. The
transitional generations are worse off. Feldstein’s (1995, 1996) appeals for privatization
are  therefore  best  interpreted  as  expressing  a  personal  value  judgment  that  future
generations deserve more resources.15
under the MB plan (1.6% more than now), 10.6% under the IA plan (unchanged),
and  5.6%  under  the  PSA  plan  (5%  less).  Since  the  individual  accounts  are
neutral,  these  percentages  indicate  the  relative  scale  of  the  plans’
intergenerational redistribution and hence, their relative impact on savings,
capital accumulation, and interest rates.
Second,  reduced  population  growth  per  se  has  quite  positive
macroeconomic effects. At a given payroll tax rate, a slowdown in population
growth  raises  the  equilibrium  capital-labor  ratio,  which  reduces  the  real
return on capital while increasing the wage rate. Reduced population growth is
therefore likely to reduce interest rates and  to  raise  per-capita  incomes.
These positive effects of reduced population growth should not be ignored in
the social security reform debate.
5. Intergenerational Risk-Sharing
Among  the  Advisory  Council’s  proposals,  the  idea  of  trust  fund  equity
investments is perhaps the most challenging to evaluate. Fortunately, we have
already  established  that  equity  investments  in  individuals  accounts  are
economically neutral. The main issue is therefore how to evaluate proposals
such as the MB plan that shift investment risks to future generations.
An assessment of such proposals requires a study of how macroeconomic
risks are allocated across generations and of how the government affects the
sharing  of  such  risks.  Given  the  focus  on  intergenerational  issues,  a
stochastic overlapping generations model  is  the  natural  tool  for  analysis.
This section describes such a model and its main implications. (For details,
see the appendix and Bohn, 1997.) To anticipate, trust fund equity investments
are a surprisingly good idea in principle, though there are many caveats and
one has to be careful about the implementation.16
5.1. A Framework for Economic Analysis
My  results  about  the  macroeconomic  implications  of  alternative  trust  fund
investment policies are based on a standard two-period overlapping generations
model. Each generation works, saves, and consumes when young, and consumes all
its income when old.  Savings  are  invested  in  capital  or  government  bonds.
Equity securities represent a claim on uncertain future capital income. Bonds
offer a safe return. Output is produced with labor and capital and it is used
for consumption, capital investment, and government spending. All these are
standard assumptions. Going beyond the standard setting, the model includes a
social security system with funded and PAYG components, wage-indexed benefits,
and a trust fund that can be invested in stocks or bonds. “Regular” government
operations  include  lump-sum  taxes  on  young  and  old  (separate  from  payroll
taxes), real spending, and government debt.
To  examine  alternative  trust  fund  investments,  explicit  assumptions
about the sources macroeconomic risk are needed. I assume that capital income
is risky because of uncertainty about future productivity (productivity risk)
and because of uncertainty about the resale value of capital goods (valuation
risk). Under standard assumptions about production (Cobb-Douglas technology),
productivity risk has a common impact on future output, wages,  and  capital
income. Without another source of risk, all these variables would be perfectly
correlated. While a perfect correlation is clearly too extreme (explaining why
I assume valuation risk a second source of risk), capital and labor incomes
are indeed highly  correlated  in  the  long  run.13  This  has  an  immediate  and
perhaps  surprising  implication:  Equities  are  a  much  more  natural  hedging
instrument for a wage-indexed social security system than government bonds.
                        
13 See Baxter and Jermann (1997). Shiller’s (1993) finding of a low short term correlation
(in 5-year growth rates) is of limited relevance in this context, because correlations at
generational frequencies are at issue. Baxter and Jermann’s finding of cointegration between
capital and labor income implies a high long run correlation.17
(Of  course,  wage-indexed  securities  would  be  even  better  from  this
perspective.)
Finally, assumptions about government policy are needed  because  there
are  too  many  policy  choices  to  examine  them  all.  To  focus  on  alternative
social security investments, I assume that most policy variables grow at the
same  rate  as  the  young  generation’s  wage  income.  This  is  assumed  for
government  debt,  real  spending,  social  security  benefits,  other  taxes  and
transfers to the old, and the overall trust fund balance. This leaves payroll
taxes and regular taxes on the young as the variables that fluctuate as needed
to satisfy the social security and the general government budget constraints,
respectively.
Given a constant replacement rate and a constant target for the trust
fund balance relative to wages, payroll taxes must rise (or can fall) whenever
past trust fund investments have yielded particularly low (or high) returns.
This  is  the  sense  in  which  the  young  bear  the  risk  of  social  security
investments. Similarly, regular taxes on the young must rise (or  can  fall)
whenever government debt has increased (or decreased) relative to the debt-
income target. Importantly, safe trust fund investments and safe debt will      not     
generally yield stable tax rates, due to the uncertain level of future wages.
5.2. Results
The main positive results are about the return on capital, the equity premium
and the safe interest rate. Under reasonable simplifying assumptions, one can
show that      trust            fund            investments            in            equities            unambiguousl           y            reduce            the            equity
     premium      . The economic argument is that trust fund equity investments reduce
the productivity and valuation risks carried by the old generation.  On  the
margin, the old are therefore less willing to accept a lower return on bonds
than they are expected to obtain on stocks.18
With regard to other macroeconomic effects, it  is  notable  that  trust
fund equity investments have negligible effects on savings and on the expected
return on capital, provided the total trust fund balance remains unchanged.
The reduced equity premium therefore implies a higher safe interest rate.
Quantitatively, the effects of alternative trust fund  investments  are
small for realistic parameter values. This is because even a trillion dollar
trust fund amounts to only a small share of U.S. households’ total assets. For
simple  benchmark  assumptions  laid  out  in  the  appendix,  the  equity  premium
under the MB plan is about 10 basis points lower with bond investments than
with equity investments, and the safe interest  rate  is  higher  by  the  same
amount.  The  PSA  plan  with  its  transitional  debt  would  reduce  the  equity
premium by about 15-20 basis points. (The safe interest rate would nonetheless
fall under the PSA  plan  because  of  the  reduced  scale  of  intergenerational
redistribution; see Section 6.)
On the normative side,  the  overlapping  generations  model  yields  four
general insights about the welfare effects of alternative policies:
1. Policy changes may make all generations better off in the  Pareto  sense,
because the intergenerational allocation of risk is generally inefficient
in the absence of government intervention. Unborn generation cannot engage
in risk-sharing contracts, but the government can do so on their behalf.
2. There is a crucial difference between efficient risk sharing and Pareto-
improvement. More efficient risk-sharing has the potential for making all
generations better off, but the generations carrying more risk must receive
more transfers in expectation.
This point is immediately relevant for the  MB  plan,  which  shifts  risks  to
future generations. If higher expected stock returns (versus bond returns) are
exploited  to  justify  lower  trust  fund  contributions  rather  than  to  reduce
future  payroll  taxes,  the  current  generations  are  made  better  off  at  the
expense of future generations.19
3. The efficient allocation of risk depends on a number of considerations. One
issue  is  consumption-smoothing,  the  fact  that  the  young  can  spread  the
effect of temporary income  shocks  over  more  periods  than  the  old.  This
enables to young to bear more income uncertainty than the old. A second
issue  is  dynamic  hedging,  especially  in  the  context  of  productivity
uncertainty. Unexpectedly high productivity growth tends to raise interest
rates and future returns on equity by reducing the effective capital-labor
ratio. A high exposure to productivity risk enables the young  to  better
exploit such time-varying investment opportunities. This argument applies
even  if  productivity  shocks  are  permanent,  making  consumption  smoothing
arguments  irrelevant,  provided  the  young  have  a  sufficiently  high
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution.  Finally,  the  young  should
obviously carry more risk if the old are more risk averse.
4. Policy changes that reduce the variance of both generation’s consumption
are generally efficiency-increasing. For a given volatility  of  aggregate
consumption,  the  sharing  of  generation-specific  risks  is  therefore  a
straightforward way to improve welfare. Valuation risk is one example.
The practical implications for trust fund investments in equities depend
on  a  comparison  of  the  efficient  allocation  of  risk  with  the  existing
allocation. The potential for sharing generation-specific risks  provides  an
immediate  argument  for  social  security  equity  investments.  In  the  market
allocation, the old are exposed to the risk of changes in asset prices. This
risk can be shared with subsequent generations through social security equity
investments.
With respect to productivity risk, the welfare gains from shifting trust
fund  balances  into  equities  are  more  difficult  to  assess.  The  efficient
allocation  depends  on  all  the  considerations  mentioned  above.  Existing
government debt already provides the old with safe securities that reduces the
volatility  of  their  income  and  thereby  reduces  the  benefits  of  additional
risk-shifting from old to young. It would take a quite  ambitious  empirical
study  to  determine  whether  the  old  are  currently  too  little  or  too  much20
exposed to productivity risk, nothing less than a comprehensive survey of all
relevant sources of risk affecting U.S. households of different ages.
If social security equity investments ARE efficient, one still has to be
careful about the distribution of the efficiency gains to ensure that a shift
to equities is a Pareto-improvement. The trust fund expects to gain the equity
premium times the amount shifted to equities. The old generation (which holds
more bonds and fewer equities) gains safety but looses the  equity  premium.
Future  young  generations  bear  increased  risks.  So,  who  should  receive  the
trust fund’s expected gain?
One allocation scheme is to reduce initial  trust  fund  investments  so
that the balance after expected earnings remains unchanged. An alternative is
to  leave  investments  unchanged  so  that  the  higher  returns  reduce  expected
future payroll taxes. In the first case, the old receive all the trust fund’s
expected  gains  plus  lower  risk,  while  future  generations  are  stuck  with
increased risk. This is not a Pareto-improvement. In the second case, future
generations receive an expected gain in exchange for taking risk while the old
receive a lower but safer income. This  allocation  is  unambiguously  Pareto-
improving: The equity premium exactly compensates the old for switching from
equities to bonds, and the young are better off because they are better able
to carry productivity risk. (Otherwise the shift would not be efficient.) If
the young are      strictly       better off, a slightly higher expected payroll tax and
a slightly reduced initial trust fund investment would also yield a Pareto-
improvement. Nonetheless, the basic  insight  is  that  the  bulk  of  the  trust
fund’s expected gain must be given to  the  young  as  compensation  for  risk.
Unfortunately, the MB plan seems to propose the very allocation scheme that is
     not       Pareto-improving.21
5.3. Discussion
The  notion  that  the  U.S.  social  security  trust  fund  should  buy  stocks  is
clearly  a  radical  idea.  Hence,  a  number  of  additional  issues  should  be
considered  before  any  final  judgment  is  made.  Potentially  relevant  items
include distortionary taxation, an imperfect correlation between the returns
on publicly traded equities and on capital, the uneven distribution of stock
holdings across households, bequests, and the equity premium puzzle. (See also
Diamond, 1996; Stiglitz et al., 1997.)
Distortionary taxes are an important complication because they limit the
government’s ability to enter into risk-sharing contracts  on  behalf  of  the
unborn. If uncertainty is resolved in a way that the government faces large
payments to the old, the government would have to collect from the young by
imposing  high,  and  hence  highly  distortionary  taxes.  To  minimize  tax
distortions,  the  government  should  issue  securities  that  result  in  “tax-
smoothing,” i.e., allow a financing of government spending and debt service
with minimal variations in tax rates (Bohn 1990). With regard to securities
that  are  positively  correlated  with  the  tax  base--such  as  equities--tax-
smoothing  implies  that  the  government  should  take  a       short        position.  In
contrast, social security equity investments would represent a      long       position.
A reconciliation of the tax-smoothing and the intergenerational risk-sharing
perspectives is well beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  Even  if  risk-sharing
considerations justify an overall government short position in safe assets, it
is  not  clear  that  government’s  current  short  position  in  safe  assets  is
inefficiently small--which is the claim one would have to make to establish
the optimality of trust fund equity investments.
The  case  for  trust  fund  equity  investments  is  also  weakened  if  the
return on publicly-traded equities  is  only  imperfectly  correlated  with  the22
return  on  the  nation’s  overall  wealth.  This  is  a  significant  limitation,
because total U.S. wealth far exceeds the capitalization of the stock market.
According to the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds accounts, the U.S. net wealth
at  the  end  of  1993  amounted  to  almost  $17  trillion,  excluding  consumer
durables. More than half of this--about $10 trillion--represents the value of
residential  real  estate  and  land,  while  plant,  equipment,  and  inventories
amount to less than $7 trillion. Even if the social security trust fund buys a
significant  share  of  the  stock  market  (a  claim  on  plant,  equipment,
inventories, and some real estate), the old generation would still hold the
majority of national wealth.
A  third  complication  is  that  share  holdings  are  quite  unevenly
distributed across households (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991). This unevenness is
not  well  understood.  Plausible  reasons  include  liquidity  constraints,
differences in income, fixed cost of investing in stocks, and/or differences
in the degree of risk aversion. Heterogeneous risk aversion is  perhaps  the
most troublesome of these complications. In a market allocation, risky assets
will  presumably  be  held  by  the  most  risk-tolerant  individuals,  while  more
risk-averse individuals will hold safer assets, yielding an efficient cross-
sectional allocation of risk. Government holdings of equities would expose all
individuals  to  equity  risk  in  proportion  to  their  tax  liabilities  without
allowing for any sorting by risk aversion.
A related issue is the equity premium puzzle, the fact that the equity
premium is higher than standard models would predict (Mehra-Prescott, 1985). A
survey of the policy implications goes well beyond the scope of this paper;
see  Bohn  (1993,  1995).  But  it  seems  dangerous  to  advocate  government
investments  in  equities       because        we  do  not  understand  the  phenomenon--as
opposed to taking the more prudent position of not betting against the market.23
Moreover, the safe real rate has been much higher since the mid-1980s than in
the period studied by Mehra and Prescott (about 3.5% for 1983-95 versus 0.8%
in  Mehra-Prescott).  Hence,  the  equity  premium  puzzle  does  not  provide  a
convincing argument for or against any particular policy.
Bequests and other transfers within families are obvious substitutes for
government intervention in the  area  of  intergenerational  risk  sharing.  The
results  of  Altonji  et.al.  (1996)  suggest,  however,  that  such  private  risk
sharing is very incomplete. In any case, bequests would at  most  neutralize
some  of  the  government’s  risk-shifting  policies  but  they  are  unlikely  to
overturn the above results.
Finally, the underlying model could be generalized in many directions,
e.g., to reflect additional sources of uncertainty such as government spending
shocks and inflation; to model the fact that post-retirement social security
benefits are inflation-indexed rather  than  wage-indexed;  or  to  include  the
inflation risk inherent in government bonds. But such extensions are unlikely
to  overturn  the  basic  results  about  risk  sharing.  For  example,  a  more
elaborate  model  of  inflation  risk  and  of  the  partially  inflation-indexed
nature of the social security might soften the distinction between “safe” debt
and “risky” (wage-contingent) social security. But it  would  not  change  the
more  fundamental  insight  that  the  government  affects  the  intergenerational
allocation of risk by supplying safe assets to the old.
  Overall, it is difficult to make a definite case for  social  security
investments in the stock market, but it also surprisingly difficult to make a
definite case against such investments.  
6. Policy options at a time of demographic change
Since much of the current policy debate is motivated by demographic pressures,
social security reform proposals are best compared in a setting with declining24
population  growth.  Such  a  setting  is  also  interesting  because  it  raises
questions about the appropriate benchmark for policy reforms: With declining
population  growth,  historical  tax  and  replacement  rates  are  no  longer
feasible. To compare some basic policy options, I consider a permanent, one-
step decline in the population growth rate at some date t=0 in the context of
a simple calibrated overlapping-generations model.14 Despite the calibration,
the  focus  should  be  on  the  qualitative  differences  of  the  principal
alternatives, not on the raw numbers. In Tables 1-2 and Figures 1-5, numbers
are  provided  for  illustrative  purposes  and  to  indicate  rough  orders  of
magnitude,  but  the  model  is  definitely  not  suitable  for  precise  numerical
predictions. With these caveats, here are some policy options.
The two most basic responses to reduced population growth are  to  cut
benefits or to raise taxes. Option 1 freezes the payroll tax rate (at 10%) and
cuts the replacement rate to satisfy the PAYG condition that the replacement
rate equals the tax rate times the worker-to-retirees ratio. Assuming a drop
in annual population growth from 1.5% to 0% and a generational period of 30
years, the replacement rate must fall from 32% to 20.5%.
Option  2  is  to  raise  the  payroll  tax  rate  enough  to  maintain  an
unchanged replacement rate of 32%; this requires a tax rate of 15.6%.
Option  3  is  to  maintain  constant  benefits  but  with  an  earlier  and
smoother path of tax increases. Specifically, let generation t=1 be the first
non-growing cohort, and assume that generations 0 and 1 are supposed to be
taxed at a common rate. Then period-0 taxes must cover current cost plus a
“surcharge” that allows the higher cost in period t=1 to be financed without a
tax increase (see Table 1 for the data).
                        
14 In the U.S., the decline in population growth rates did not happen instantaneously and the
proposed policy reactions are projected to take several generations. But to understand the
conceptually  different  implications  of  the  alternative  proposals,  it  is  sufficient  to
consider a simpler, one-time shift in population growth.25
This option captures the essence of the  1983  social  security  reform,
notably the principle that social security was supposed to show a non-negative
trust fund balance with unchanged tax and benefit rules for a finite forecast
horizon. Option 3 provides an incomplete solution, however, because as time
passes and the forecast horizon extends, it becomes apparent that the period
t=2 cost rate exceeds the tax rate and that the trust fund is going to be
exhausted.15  Society  again  faces  the  choice  between  further  tax  increases
(Option 3A) and benefit cuts (Option 3B). I interpret Option 3B as a stylized
version of the Advisory Council’s IA plan. This is because the IA plan calls
for various benefit cuts but no higher taxes (disregarding the economically
neutral individual accounts). Since the MB plan calls for a tax increase in
2045 (meaning, with a delay of about two generations) I interpret Option 3A as
a stylized representation of the MB plan.16
Both Options 3A and 3B treat generations t³2 different than generations
0 and 1. If one wants to give all generations the same “deal” in terms of tax
and  replacement  rates,  a  natural  alternative  is  Option  4:  Keep  tax  rates
constant at the Option 3 level and reduce benefits to  the  point  where  the
trust  fund  becomes  a  permanent  endowment.  Interestingly,  Option  4  is
economically equivalent to Option 1, the straight benefit cut. This is because
each generation replenishes the trust fund and because self-funded trust funds
are neutral. By comparison, Option 4 shows that Options 3A and 3B are “better”
for  generation  0  and/or  generation  1  only  because  they  treat  future
generations worse.17,18
                        
15 Alternatively, in case of the 1983 reform, the scale of the demographic shift was perhaps
not fully known; in any case, the story serves to motivate an intermediate level of taxation,
below the Constant Benefits but above the Constant Taxes level.
16 Since the MB plan calls for some benefit reductions, too, one might interpret it as being
in between Options 3A and 3B; the figures show the basic, stylized alternatives for clarity.
17 For all options with trust funds, the need for higher taxes and lower benefits is reduced
if one assumes a high rate of return on the trust fund. This calculation is apparent in the
MB plan and it may explain much of the practical appeal of stock market investments in many
privatization proposals. But as shown in the previous section, such higher returns cannot be26
Finally, consider a stylized version of the PSA plan, Option 5. Option 5
calls for reductions in tax and replacement rates combined with transitional
taxes  between  now  and  2070  (roughly,  generations  0-2).  The  need  for
transitional  taxes  follows  directly  from  the  no-free-lunch  principle:  The
scale of intergenerational redistribution can only be reduced if the inherited
burden of PAYG social security is paid off during the transition.
Overall, Figure 1 shows that most policy options involve benefit cuts.
Options 3B and 4 imply smaller benefit cuts than Option 1 because they include
a “small” tax increase (see Figure 2). Options 3B and 4 differ only in the
timing of benefit reductions: Delayed reductions must be larger than earlier
ones. Similarly, Options 2 and 3A offer timing versus scale differences on the
tax side. Only Option 5 calls for reduced tax rates at a time when benefits
are already under pressure.  Figure  3  shows  the  trust  fund  balances  and/or
transitional debt implied by the alternative options: a one-generation fund
under Options 3A and 3B, a permanent fund under Option 4, and transitional
debt under the PSA-type plan.
The  macroeconomic  implications  are  shown  in  Figures  4-5.  At  a  given
payroll  tax  rate  (Option  1),  reduced  population  growth  per  se  raises  the
capital-labor ratio and reduces the real return on capital.19 In comparison,
                                                                              
exploited by current contributors without beggaring  the  future  generations  that  bear  the
corresponding  risks.  The  numerical  illustrations  assume  that  the  trust  fund  holds  wage-
indexed claims earning the same rate of return as capital (which is an appropriate benchmark
in a stochastic environment), without taking the high return as an excuse for reduced trust
fund contributions.
18 To be precise, all three Advisory Council plans provide for a positive trust fund balance
at the end of the Council’s 75-year planning horizon. (I thank Ned Gramlich for pointing this
out.) I interpret these balances as buffer stocks that are too small to significantly affect
the interpretation. On account of the positive 75-year ahead balance, one may interpret the
actual IA plan as being somewhere in between the stylized Options 3B and 4.
19  I  should  note  here  that  the  calibration  assumes  a  unit  intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution.  This  implies  that  declining  population  growth  per  se  does  not  affect  the
savings rate for given intergenerational transfers, which is a convenient and  empirically
plausible simplification. A different elasticity value would not  significantly  affect  the
relative comparisons but it would affect the absolute changes. The declining interest rates
under Option 1 (and the equivalent Option 4) are entirely due to the demographic changes.
Under the other options, interest rate movements relative to Option 1 are policy-induced.27
Option  2  reduces  the  supply  of  savings  and  therefore  leads  to  relatively
higher (but still falling) interest rates and a lower long-run growth path of
per-capita income. The MB- and IA-type plans are in between, while the PSA-
type option goes in the opposite direction,  yielding  much  reduced  interest
rates. Throughout, safe interest rates moves similarly (not shown). Sharply
reduced interest rates under the PSA-type option might seem counterintuitive,
given the transitional debt. But by design, the debt is much      less       than the
value of social security benefits that it replaces.
Figure  5  shows  the  corresponding  time  series  of  wages,  which  are
essentially a mirror image of Figure 4. The more a policy raises savings and
reduces the interest rates,  the  more  it  increases  the  marginal  product  of
labor. In all cases, wages rise relative to the previous trend because the
decline  in  population  growth  reduces  the  supply  of  labor  relative  to  the
supply of capital.
Table 1 combines the policy options and their macroeconomic implications
and provides a set of generational net cost associated with the alternative
policies. For each generation (t), the net cost of social security is defined
as  the  payroll  tax  minus  the  present  value  of  retirement  benefits  in  the
following period (t+1), all expressed as a fraction of period-t  wages.  The
results  are  perhaps  striking:  Options  1  and  4  impose  equal  cost  on  all
generations, despite all the demographic and economic changes. The MB- and IA-
style Options 3A and  3B  reduce  generation  0’s  net  cost  at  the  expense  of
future generations. The PSA-style Option 5 does the reverse, imposing larger
cost on generations 0-2 for the benefit of generations t³3.
Why do Options 1 and 4 imply equal cost despite the reduced replacement
rates? The economic argument has two parts. First, since social security is
wage-indexed  and  since  lower  population  growth  raises  the  wage  rate,  the28
reduced replacement rate overstates the actual cut in benefits. Second, the
decline in interest rates associated with lower population growth raises the
present value of future benefits. For the  case  of  Cobb-Douglas  technology,
these two effects exactly cancel out the direct effect of reduced benefits. 
While the relative comparisons across options presented in Table 1 are
quite robust with respect to changes in the assumptions, the comparisons over
time should not be presented without a number of caveats. First, equal net
cost does not imply equal utility. Ceteris  paribus,  falling  interest  rates
imply  reduced  consumption  in  retirement,  a  negative  income  effect.  On  the
other  hand,  future  generations  are  better  and  better  off  because  of
productivity growth.
Second, the wage and interest rate paths in Figures 4-5 are based on a
closed economy model. The closed economy assumption is important because the
decline in interest rates and the increase in wages would  be  less  if  U.S.
savers invested abroad. In the extreme case of an infinitely elastic foreign
demand for U.S. savings, all interest rate and wage effects would vanish. This
is the Small Open Economy case in Figures 4 and 5, for which Table 2 shows the
implied net cost of social security. (Tax rates, replacement rates, and trust
fund  levels  are  also  shown  because  for  options  involving  trust  funds  or
borrowing,  the  set  of  feasible  tax  rates  changes  somewhat.)  The  lack  of
macroeconomic  adjustment  makes  social  security  look  much  worse,  but  the
relative comparisons across options remain largely unaffected.
The  U.S.  economy  is  certainly  not  small,  and  domestic  savings  and
investment are empirically highly correlated (Feldstein and  Horioka,  1980).
Hence, Figures 4-5 and Table 1 still provide a good benchmark. To the extent
that capital is mobile, however, the above arguments for lower interest rates
translate  directly  into  arguments  for  higher  U.S.  capital  outflows.  All29
interest rate and wage movements would then be somewhat smaller than indicated
in Figures 4 and 5.
Despite the large size of the U.S. economy, the trends towards global
capital movements and increased openness are critical issues for the future of
social security--perhaps the most critical and also the most underrated ones.
As  reduced  U.S.  population  growth  reduces  the  returns  to  domestic  capital
investment,  U.S.  workers  have  huge  incentives  to  invest  their  retirement
savings  abroad,  most  likely  in  developing  countries  where  high  population
growth  will  generate  attractive  investment  opportunities.  Given  these
demographic trends, globalization and increased investment in emerging markets
are natural phenomena. The magnitude of such capital flows is  difficult  to
predict  because  U.S.  investors’  willingness  to  go  abroad  may  depend
sensitively  on  a  variety  of  economic  and  political  developments  in  the
capital-receiving  countries.  But  such  capital  flows  determine  whether  the
future of social security will be more like Table 1 or like Table 2.
Three other modeling issues should be mentioned. First, bequests and the
nature  of  bequest  motives  are  potentially  important.  To  the  extent  that
different  generations  are  altruistically  linked  through  Barro  (1974)  style
bequest motives, the effects of social security may be reduced. But unless all
families  are  altruistically  linked,  such  linkages  will  only  moderate  the
effects discussed above, but not eliminate or overturn them.
Second,  liquidity  constraints  may  matter  for  the  economic  effect  of
trust  funds  and  individual  accounts.  By  definition,  liquidity  constrained
consumers prefer to consume more and save less than their credit limit allows,
i.e., they discount future transfers at a higher rate than the market interest
rate. Hence, they are unambiguously worse off under a plan with a trust fund
or  individual  accounts  than  under  an  otherwise  equivalent  plan  with  lower30
taxes  and  benefits.  (They  would,  e.g.,  prefer  Option  1  over  Option  4).
Liquidity constraints also imply that increased government savings in a trust
fund are not automatically neutralized by reduced  private  savings.  A  trust
fund may therefore raise national savings, lower  interest  rates,  and  raise
long run output as compared to an “equivalent” plan without trust fund. But
since the liquidity-constrained consumers are worse off and everyone else is
indifferent, the increased savings and higher output do not provide arguments
for a trust fund. Instead, the case of liquidity constraints offers a nice
example of a welfare-reducing increase in output, i.e., an argument against
social security trust funds and against individual accounts.
Finally,  note  that  I  treat  population  growth  as  deterministic.  In
principle, one might think of demographic uncertainty as a source of risk that
raises similar risk-sharing questions as the uncertainty  about  productivity
growth.20 If the  decline  in  fertility  over  recent  decades  is  viewed  as  an
unexpected shock, risk-sharing considerations suggest that the impact should
be shared among all generations, perhaps including current retirees. This is
another interesting issue for future research.
7. Conclusions
The  paper  has  examined  the  effects  of  alternative  social  security  reform
proposals on stock and  bonds  markets,  with  special  emphasis  on  the  recent
Presidential  Advisory  Council  plans.  The  key  issues  are  intergenerational
redistribution and intergenerational risk sharing.
The  three  Advisory  Council  plans  redistribute  resources  across
generations  in  very  different  ways.  The  intermediate  IA  plan  essentially
amounts to reducing benefits in response to  adverse  demographics.  Since  it
                        
20 One difference is that changes in the work force are predictable (with a caveat about
immigration) about one generation in advance, since children do not enter the  work  force
right after their birth. Hence, the demographics are somewhat more foreseeable.31
calls for an unchanged fraction of wages that is transferred from young to old
it is not likely to have significant effects on the savings rate, interest
rates, or stock and bond prices. In comparison, the MB plan calls for higher
benefits and taxes. Such increased transfers from young to old will lead to
relatively higher interest rates and put per-capita incomes on a lower long-
run trajectory, but they will make the current generation better off than the
alternative  plans.  The  PSA  plan,  in  contrast,  outlines  a  transition  to
significantly lower long run transfers from young  to  old.  It  is  likely  to
reduce  interest  rates  and  to  put  per-capita  incomes  on  a  higher  long-run
trajectory, but at the expense of the generations paying for the transition.
All three plans involve equity investments of retirement funds, but in
very different ways. Under the IA and PSA plans, equity investment takes place
in  individual  accounts,  which  means  that  the  retirees  bear  the  associated
risks and returns. To a first approximation, these accounts are economically
neutral and have no effects on interest rates or the equity premium. Under the
MB plan, however, the risk of unexpected stock price movements is effectively
shifted to future generations. This proposal raises important questions about
intergenerational risk sharing. Government policy is potentially important in
this context, because the government can enter  into  insurance  contracts  on
behalf  of  unborn  future  generations.  Perhaps  surprisingly,  trust  funds
investments in equities may in principle be a good idea, because the sharing
of equity risk between  current  and  future  generations  may  yield  a  Pareto-
improvement in the intergenerational allocation of risk. The specific MB plan,
however, is better described as a disguised increase in risk-adjusted benefits
to the old at the expense of future generations.  32
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Appendix
A. The Overlapping Generations Model
The  results  of  Sections  3-6  are  derived  within  the  following  stochastic
overlapping generations model. Individuals live for two periods. Generation t
consists of Nt individuals who work in period t and retire in period t+1. To
match empirical worker-to-retiree ratios, I assume that generation t workers
receive benefits for a fraction lt of period t+1. (One may assume that they
are “alive” for only this period or with this probability; see below for the
ramifications.) Workers earn a wage wt equal to the marginal product of labor,
pay payroll taxes on wages at the rate qt, and pay other taxes amounting to
t1t. The  disposable  income  wt·(1-qt)-t1t  is  either  consumed  (c1t)  or  saved.
Savings  are  either  held  as  equity  securities  (set+1)  or  in  form  of  bonds
(sbt+1),
(A1) c1t = wt·(1-qt) - t1t - set+1 - sbt+1.
The rates  of  return  on  equities  and  bonds  are  denoted  by  Ret+1  and  Rbt+1,
respectively. Equity returns are stochastic. Bond returns are assumed known at
time t. Retirees receive social security benefits bt+1·lt+1·wt+1 and pay taxes
t2t+1, so that their consumption is
(A2) c2t+1 = Ret+1·set+1 + Rbt+1·sbt+1 + bt+1·lt+1·wt+1 - t2t+1.
Savings  decisions  are  determined  by  the  usual  first  order  conditions  (see
Bohn, 1997, for details).
To study social security,  government  operations  are  divided  into  two
parts. In period t, social security collects payroll taxes qt·Nt·wt from the
young and pays benefits lt·Nt-1·bt·wt to the retired generation t-1. Relative
to the period-t payroll, the cost can be expressed in terms of the cost rate
b*t = bt·lt·Nt-1/Nt. Under a pure PAYG system, the tax rate has to match the
cost rate at all times. In a mixed, partially funded social security system,
the difference between payroll tax receipts and benefit cost are invested in a
trust fund. The social security budget equation is then
(A3) qt·Nt·wt + TF*t + TRSt = bt·lt·Nt-1·wt + TFet+1 + TFbt+1
where TF*t is the initial trust fund balance, TFet+1 and TFbt+1 are  the  new
equity and bond investments, respectively, and TRS is a (possible) transfer
from the general government to social security. Capital letters are used to
denote aggregate quantities. The overall trust fund balance at the start of
period t+1 depends on market returns,A-2
(A4) TF*t+1 = Ret+1 · TFet+1 + Rbt+1 · TFbt+1.
Bond investments are assumed to be in government bonds. Total Treasury debt
Dt+1  minus  the  social  security  holdings  TFbt+1  can  then  be  interpreted  as
publicly-held (net) debt Dnett+1.
The general government finances its total spending Gt through  general
taxes and by issuing bonds. In this context, taxes can be interpreted as taxes
minus  transfers  (negative  taxes)  and  spending  as  total  outlays  excluding
interest  payments  and  excluding  transfers  to  social  security,  which  are
tracked separately. The general government budget equation is
(A5) Nt·t1t + Nt-1·t2t + Dt+1 = Gt + TRSt + Rbt·Dt  
Tax revenues and new debt issue are used to finance spending, transfers to
social security, and interest plus principal on old debt. Combined with the
social security budget, one obtains a unified government budget equation
(A6) Nt·wt·qt + Nt·t1t + Nt-1·t2t - bt·lt·Nt-1·wt + Dt+1 + TF*t
= Gt + Rbt·Dt + TFet+1 + TFbt+1,
or equivalently,
(A7) Nt·wt·qt + Nt·t1t + Nt-1·t2t - bt·lt·Nt-1·wt + Dnett+1
= Gt + Rbt·Dnett + (TFet+1 - Ret·TFet)
Net revenues from regular and payroll taxes plus new      net       debt issues (Dnett+1)
pay for social security benefits, non-interest spending (G), payment on the
initial       net        debt,  and  new  equity  investments  (TFet+1  minus  the  existing
holdings Ret·TFet). The unified budget equation illustrates the interaction of
government  debt  and  the  social  security  trust  fund.  Bond  holdings  in  the
social security trust fund reduce the publicly-held Treasury debt. A shift of
trust fund investment from bonds to equity would therefore raise the publicly-
held Treasury debt, one-for-one.
Note that lt is only applied to social security benefits. I treat  it
simply as a device  to  reconcile  empirical  replacement  rates  in  the  30-35%
range with payroll taxes in the 10-15% range. If one seriously interpreted lt
as a survival rate, it would have to be applied to all old-age incomes. The
actuarial fairness of annuity markets would then become an issue; the model
should could then be interpreted as a setting with fair annuities paying Rb/l
or Re/l to survivors (see Bohn, 1997, for alternative interpretations).
An equilibrium on equity and bond markets requires that individual plus
social security trust fund holdings of these securities equal the supply. ToA-3
simplify the accounting, I assume that firms’ capital is equity financed and
that the market value of firms is the capital stock. (Adjustment cost that
might  make  firm  values  deviate  from  the  value  of  their  capital  stock  are
unlikely to be important on the time scale considered here. Leverage could be
added  in  a  straightforward  way  and  it  would  not  change  any  significant
results, except that it would improve the model’s ability to match the equity
premium.) Equity holdings by individuals and the social security trust fund
must then add up to the aggregate capital stock Kt+1,
(A8) Nt·set + TRet+1 = Kt+1
and their bond holdings  must  add  up  to  gross  government.  Or  equivalently,
individuals must hold the net supply of government bonds,
(A9) Nt·sbt = Dnett+1.
A key insight for policy analysis is that individual behavior depends on
government policy only through the net cash flow to and from the government,
regardless of how these payments are labeled. (Similar neutrality results have
been derived by Stiglitz (1983) for tax  and  debt  changes  and  by  Kotlikoff
(1986) for social security in a deterministic context.) Let  




be the net payment from the young      to       the government and let
(A11) CF2t+1 = bt+1·wt+1 - t2t+1 + Rbt+1·
Dt+1-TRbt+1
Nt




be the net payment      from       the government to the old. Then the individual budget
equations can be written more compactly as
c1t = wt - Kt+1/Nt - CF1t,
c2t+1 = Ret+1·Kt+1/Nt + CF2t+1
using  the  above  equilibrium  conditions.  Moreover,  the  unified  government
budget equation reduces to
(A12) Nt·CF1t = Nt-1·CF2t + Gt.
The  government  collects  from  the  young  to  pay  for  real  spending  and  net
transfers to the old. Note that CF1t and/or CF2 can theoretically be negative,
through there are defined such that they are likely positive in reality.
The  cash  flow  measures  show  that  a  variety  of  differently  labeled
policies are equivalent. Propositions 1-5 are examples that can be formalized
as follows:
     Proposition            1      : A change in benefits by Dbt+1 affects CF2t+1 in the same way as
a change in taxes by Dt2t+1 = -Dbt+1·wt+1.A-4
     Proposition            2      : A rise in payroll taxes by Dqt  increases  the  trust  fund  by
DTFbt + DTFet = wt·Nt·Dqt, and leaves CF1t unchanged. The higher trust  fund
balance will be matched  by  an  equal  reduction  in  private  savings,  leaving
national savings, the capital stock and interest rates unchanged. If the trust
fund is investing in bonds, individuals will reduce bond holdings by the same
amount. If the trust  fund  is  investing  in  stocks,  individuals  will  reduce
stock holdings by the same amount. In either case, the return on the trust
fund  raises  the  replacement  rate  in  period  t+1  by  Dbt+1=Rbt+1·DTFbt  +
Ret+1·DTFet, leaving CF2t+1 unchanged.
     Proposition            3      : If a trust fund is used to finance benefits that were supposed
to be paid by the next young generation, the generation building up the trust
fund  is  in  effect  financing  part  of  their  own  retirement  benefits.  As  in
Proposition  2,  CF1t  remains  unchanged;  but  CF2t+1  falls  as  if  bt+1  were
reduced.
     Proposition            4      : Under uncertainty, individual behavior is unaffected by policy
changes only if the cash flows of alternative policies are identical across
all possible realizations of uncertain future events. If the social security
trust  fund  invests  in  stocks  rather  than  bonds--raising  TRe  but  leaving
TRe+TRb and CF1t unchanged, CF2t+1 will change by the stochastic amount (Ret+1-
Rbt+1)·DTRe.  To  keep  CF2t+1  unchanged,  bt+1  and/or  t2t+1  must  vary
stochastically by an offsetting amount: If taxes are fixed, benefits must be
reduced if Ret+1<Rbt+1  and  they  can  be  raised  if  Ret+1>Rbt+1,  always  by  the
amount  Db2t+1·wt+1=(Ret+1-Rbt+1)·DTRe.  Alternatively,  if  bt+1  is  fixed,
neutrality would require the government to impose a tax in the amount Dt2t+1=-
(Ret+1-Rbt+1)·DTRe on the old (or if negative, a transfer).
     Proposition            5      : Suppose generation t is the “last” young generation that pays
benefits to the old without itself receiving benefits. If this generation is
given  a  transfer  of  government  bonds  equal  to  the  present  value  of  the
previously  scheduled  benefits,  D(Dt/Nt)=D(-t1t)  implies  equal  CF1t.  But  to
leave CF2t+1 unchanged, one needs Rbt+1·D(Dt/Nt) = bt+1·wt+1 for all states of
nature, i.e., wage-indexed bonds. In future periods (t+i), if the  level  of
debt  D(Dt+i/Nt+i)  must  similarly  be  maintained  at  a  level  equal  to  the
previously scheduled social security benefits.
For  the  general  equilibrium  analysis  in  Sections  4-6,  the  following
assumptions  about  preferences,  technology,  and  policy  are  imposed.  ToA-5
distinguish the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from the degree of
risk aversion, I consider a recursive, non-expected utility function
(A13) Ut = 
1
1-h1
 ·[(c1t)e + r·{Et[(c2t+1)(1-h2)]}e/(1-h2)](1-h1)/e
that even allows the risk aversion of the old (h2) to differ from the risk
aversion of the young (h1). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
1/(1-e). This specification reduces to the standard CRRA case for h1=h2=1/(1-
e). Regarding production, I assume a Cobb-Douglas technology with stochastic
total factor productivity At and stochastic depreciation rate 1-dt,
Yt = Ft(Kt,Nt) = Kta·(At·Nt)1-a + dt·Kt,
where At follows an exponential random walk, At = At-1·(1+at) with at  being
i.i.d, and dt is simply i.i.d. The model  is  solved  by  taking  a  log-linear
approximation around the deterministic steady state. Below, the variables d,
k,  s,  c1/w,  and  c2/w  denote  the  steady  state  ratios  of  government  debt,
capital investment, the trust fund balance, the consumption of the young, and
the consumption of the old to the wage rate, respectively; ib and ie are the
portfolio shares of the trust fund in bonds and equities, respectively; and j*
= (c1/w)e/[r·(c2/w)e·(1+a)e] is a constant. The deterministic steady state is
characterized by the constraints
(c1/w) = 1 - g - D - k
(c2/w) = (1+n)·[D + 
a
1-a  + d·k
an
 ]





  + d)·r]1/(1-e)
where D = b* - t2/w/(1+n) + (
a
1-a ·1
k  + 
d
an )·(d-s).
is  a  measure  summary  measure  of  intergenerational  redistribution.  Hence,
intergenerational redistribution depends on the cost rate and on government
debt net of the social security trust fund holdings. It is straightforward to
show that k depends negatively on D. One can also show that the log equity
premium is
ln(EtRet+1) - ln(Rbt+1) = h2·COVt(ln(Ret+1),ln(c2t+1))
= h2·{(d/Re)2·(k-s·ie)/(c1/w)·j*·VAR(ln(dt))
+ (1-d/Re)·[1-{(k-s·ie)·d/Re+(d-s·ib)}/(c1/w)·j*]·(1-a)2·VAR(ln(at))},
a function of the risk aversion of the old and the variance of the two shocks.
It is clearly a declining function of ie (with ib=1-ie).A-6
B. The Policy Options in Section 6
The  assumptions  about  policy  in  Section  6  are  as  follows.  The  population
growth rate falls at time 0 from a high rate n0=n-i = nH (high) to a lower
rate ni = nL (low), for all periods i³1. The shift becomes known in period t=0
(when the number of infants who will become workers in period t=1 are born)
and  it  is  unanticipated  (or  was  considered  so  unlikely  that  it  did  not
significantly affect the savings behavior prior to period 0).
Option 1 is to freeze the payroll tax rate (q) and cut the replacement
rate  from  b0=q/l·(1+nH)  to  bt=q/l·(1+nL)  for  t>0.  Option  2  is  to  maintain
constant benefits (b) and to raise the payroll tax rate from q0=b·l/(1+nH) to
qt=b·l/(1+nL) to cover the cost increase.
Option  3  is  to  maintain  constant  benefits,  but  with  equal  taxes  on
generations t and t+1. Taxes in period t are set to q0=b·l/(1+nH) + q+, where
q+  is  the  minimum  feasible  “surcharge”  such  that  if  one  invests  q+  on
financial  markets,  benefits  in  period  t+1  can  be  financed  without  a  tax
increase. That is, set q0 = q1 = b/(1+nL)-q* where q*·N1·w1 = Rw1·q+·N0·w0 is
financed out of the trust fund with earnings and Rw is the rate of return on
wage  contingent  claims,  which  is  the  appropriate  discount  rate  in  this
context. After period t+1, either (3A) taxes are raised to the level of Option
2 or (3B) benefits are reduced to the PAYG level.
Option 4 for requires the following: Set q0 = b/(1+nH) + q+ = qt equal to
the  level  of  Option  3B.  Starting  period  1,  the  replacement  rate  must  be







 , where Rw0,t = 
Õ
j=1
t   Rwj
which ensures that the trust fund is never exhausted.
For Option 5, I reduce the replacement rate in periods t+1 and beyond
such that the cost  rate  is  5.6%,  the  value  discussed  in  Section  2.2.  The
payroll tax rate in periods t+3 and beyond is set equal to the cost rate as
required in a PAYG system. During the transition, taxes qt=qt+1=qt+2=qT are set
such that the social security present value  constraint  is  satisfied,  which
means:  (b*0-qT)·w0  +  (b*1-qT)·w1/Rw1  +  (b*2-qT)·w2/(Rw1·Rw2)  =  0.  Since
b*0<b*1=b*2,  this  involves  a  debt-financed  deficit  followed  by  surpluses
sufficient to retire the debt, and a value qT in between b*0 and b*1.A-7
The net cost entries in Tables 1-2 for the different generations (t) are
defined as the payroll tax minus the present value of retirement benefits in
the following period (t+1) as a fraction of current wages,




Note that interest  rates  (Rw)  and  wage  growth  are  the  only  required
macro data in this context. The small open economy results described in Table
2 can therefore be obtained without any macro modeling, simply by treating Rw
and  wage  growth  as  constant.  In  Table  2,  the  above  policy  options  are
calibrated as follows. All  “generational”  growth  rates  are  compounded  from
annual  growth  rates  assuming  generational  period  of  30  years.  The  initial
“high” growth rate of the labor force is based on a 1.5% annual growth rate of
the labor force, 1+nH = 1.01530 = 1.56, and future growth is 1+nL=1 (close to
the Social Security Administration’s intermediate forecast for 2020-2070). The
current worker-to-retiree ratio of 3.2 = N0/(l·N-1) = (1+nH)/l  then  implies
l=0.488. This is set constant, assuming future retirement ages are indexed to
life expectancy. For the rate of return, I start from the advisory council’s
values of 7% for the equity return and 2.3% for the real rate.  Since  U.S.
equity is a leveraged claim on capital at a debt/equity ratio of about 50%,
this implies an annual return on unlevered equity of about 5%; I actually use
4.96% for reasons explained below. I use the same rate of return to discount
future  wages,  motivated  by  the  case  of  Cobb-Douglas  technology.  Per
generation, this yields Rw=1.049630 = 4.27. For wage growth, I use the Social
Security Administration’s intermediate projection, which calls for an annual
wage growth of 1.0%, which implies a generational value of wt+1/wt = 1.0125 =
1.35.
For the policy options, I set q = b* = 10% for the period-t benchmark,
motivated by the current cost rate of about 10%. For plans with trust fund
balance  and/or  debt,  the  ratio  of  the  trust  fund  balance  to  payroll  is
interpreted as a ratio involving a generation’s worth of wages.  To  convert
annual into generational flows, I multiply by an annuity factor of 32.7. This
is because the value of annual savings of 1% of payroll for 30 years is worth
about 32.7% of the wage at the midpoint of this interval (accumulating and
discounting for 15 year forward and backward, respectively). After earning 30-
years’ worth of interest, the savings are similarly converted back into annual
old-age  consumption.  Or  equivalently,  an  annuity  of  b-percent  of  wages  isA-8
considered equivalent to a lump-sum of 32.7·l = 15.8 times the annuity. Since
the life-expectancy at age 65 is currently about 17 years (15 for males, 19
for females), these stock/flow conversion values seem reasonable.
C. The Calibrated OG model
The underlying model is the OG model described in Appendix A. In addition to
the  above  assumptions  about  policy,  I  assume  the  following.  Technology  is
Cobb-Douglas with 100% depreciation  (over  a  generational  horizon)  and  with
capital share a=1/3. Preferences are as in (A13) with a unit  intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (the limiting case e->0), so that savings behavior
is similar to log-utility. The risk aversion parameter h2 is chosen below to
match  the  equity  premium.  The  sole  source  of  uncertainty  is  productivity
growth, which is i.i.d. (on a generational basis) with an annual mean of 1%.
To  model  the  macroeconomic  dynamics  along  a  balanced  growth  path,  most
variables  are  expressed  as  shares  of  total  payroll,  wt·Nt,  which  grows
asymptotically at the rate of productivity plus population growth. The initial
social  security  tax  and  cost  rates  are  set  to  b*t=10%  and  the  trust  fund
relative  to  payroll  is  set  to  zero,  st=TRt/(wt·Nt)=0.  Regarding  government
debt, a 53.7% debt-GDP  ratio  (1993  total  public  debt  according  to  Federal
Reserve  Release  C.9  divided  by  GDP)  divided  by  (1-a)  yields  an  annual
debt/payroll  ratio  of  80.5%  and  a  generational  ratio  of  d=Dt/(wt·Nt)=2.49%
(using  the  annuity  factor  of  32.7  explained  above).  Government
purchases/payroll  are  15.7%  of  GDP  divided  by  (1-a),  which  is
g=Gt/(wt·Nt)=23.5%.  Lacking  precise  data  on  the  generational  allocation  of
taxes, I assume the old pay taxes in proportion to their factor share and set
t2/w/(1+n)=7.85%.  The  1995  share  of  gross  investment  to  GDP  of  16.4%
(including  government  investment  minus  foreign  borrowing)  implies  an
investment/payroll ratio of k=24.65%, which is consistent with a capital share
of aggregate income of a=1/3 if and only if the annual return on capital is
4.96%.  This  is  how  the  return  on  capital  is  calibrated--without  actually
looking at return data. But the number is nicely in between the 7% return on
levered equity and the 2.3% safe rate. These data imply an initial measure of
intergenerational redistribution D = 10%  -  7.85%  +  2.03·2.49%  =  7.23%  and
consumption-wage shares of
(A14) (c1/w)t = 1 - g - Dt - kt = 0.4463 and
(A15) (c2/w)t/(1+nt) = 
a
1-a  + Dt = 0.5723.A-9
Finally, the discount factor r is set to match the observed consumption growth
at  the  observed  interest  rates,  which  implies  r=0.6323.  In  the  policy
examples,  b*t  and  st  are  varied  over  time  as  demanded  by  the  alternative
options  (see  above).  For  each  policy,  the  implied  paths  for  consumption,
savings,  and  interest  rates  are  computed  from  (A14)  and  (A15)  and  the
individual first order condition for optimal savings, using the logarithmic
and  log-normal  approximations  described  in  Bohn  (1997).  The  assumed  unit
elasticity of intertemporal substitution yields significantly simplified first
order condition in this context, namely,
(A16) 1 = r·
Et[Ret+1·(c2t+1/wt)-h2]
Et[(c2t+1/wt)1-h2]
  · (c1t/wt).
Since  wages  and  capital  income  are  perfectly  correlated  with  Cobb-Douglas
production, (c2t+1/wt) can be written as sum of a wage-contingent component
(1+n )·[
a
1-a  + b*t - t2/w/(1+n)]·(wt+1/wt)
and a safe component  Rbt·(d-st).  Since  the  safe  component  is  small  in  all
examples,  (c2t+1/wt)  is  well-approximated  log-linearly  by  (c2t+1/wt)  =
(c2/w)·(wt+1/wt)1-ct·(1+a)ct, where ct = Rbt·(d-st)/(c2/w) is the safe component
of old-age income. Since ct is generally small, one may further approximate
Et(wt+1/wt)-ct·(1+a)ct»1. As result, the first order condition (A16) reduces to






1 - g - Dt - kt
a/(1-a) + Dt+1
 .






is known at time t, the optimal investment share is a deterministic function
of alternative social security policies. This explains why the figures are not
contingent on the realizations of future productivity growth.
Equation (A16) combined with the analogous condition for the equilibrium
bond rate Rbt+1 imply an equation for the log-equity premium,
ln(EtRet+1)-ln(Rbt+1) = h2·COVt[ln(c2t+1),ln(Ret+1)]
= h2·VARt[ln(wt+1/wt)]·(1-ct),
using  again  the  log-linear  approximation  for  c2t+1  and  assuming  log-normal
wage growth. In levels, this implies
PRt = Et[Ret+1]-Rbt+1 = Rbt+1·(exp{h2·VARt[ln(wt+1/wt)]·(1-ct)}-1).
To match the initial equity premium of PR = 4.96%-2.3%=2.68% at c0=0.088, one
needs h2·VARt[ln(wt+1/wt)]=0.8446. If the variance of wage growth is proxied by
aggregate  consumption  growth  with  an  annual  standard  deviation  of  3.6%,
VARt[ln(wt+1/wt)]=0.039  implies  a  rather  high  risk  aversion  parameter  ofA-10
h2=21.7,  in  line  with  Mehra-Prescott  (1985).  But  if  the  variance  of  wage
growth is proxied by the standard deviation of stock price (18% annual for the
S&P500 scaled down to 13.5%  to  adjust  for  leverage),  VARt[ln(wt+1/wt)]=0.55
implies  a  risk  aversion  parameter  of  only  h2=1.54.  For  the  relative
comparisons in Sections 5-6, these alternative parametrizations are equivalent
because they imply the same negative dependence of the equity premium on ct.
The statements in Section 5 about the likely impact of the MB and PSA
plans  on  the  equity  premium  are  motivated  as  follows.  The  MB  plan  is
interpreted Option 3A and the PSA plan as Option 5 described in Section 6. If
the trust fund accumulated  under  Option  3A  is  invested  entirely  in  equity
(unlevered, implying an actual stock market investment of slightly above 50%),
ct will remain virtually constant, implying an unchanged equity premium. If
the trust fund is invested in bonds, however, ct will fall by more than half
to c1=0.041, raising the equity premium to PR1=2.77% from 2.66%, by 11 basis
points. Under the PSA plan, if the borrowing were done with wage-indexed bonds
(which  would  leave  the  intergenerational  allocation  of  risk  essentially
unchanged), the equity premium would decline slightly to 2.62%, in line with
generally  falling  interest  rates.  With  bond  financing,  however,  the  safe
component of old age consumption would rise to  c1=0.15  and  c2=0.136  before
returning  to  c3=0.089;  this  reduces  the  equity  premiums  to  PR1=2.46%  and
PR2=2.49% for two generations, by 20 and 17 basis points, respectively. The
fact that these changes in the equity premium are so  small  explains  why  I
simply assumed wage-indexed financing in constructing Figures 1-5.
Table 2 provides the same summary data as Table 1, but for the case of
exogenous interest rates and wages. The comparison shows that the feasible tax
and replacement rates for different generations are fairly robust with respect
to alternative assumptions. The relative comparison of net cost across options
is also similar, but the absolute level of net cost is much higher because the
failure for interest rates to fall and wages to rise implies a sharply rising
net  cost.  A  non-unit  intertemporal  elasiticity  of  substitution  would  have
similar implications: A high elasiticity would yield results similar to Table
2, while an elasticity below 1 would go in the opposite direction.A-1
Table 1: Policy Options as Population Growth Declines
Period/Generation: Memo: Trust Fund
t -1 0 1 2 3 4 0 1
Option 1: Constant Taxes/Lower Benefits
Tax rate 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5%
Net Cost 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1%
Option 2: Constant Benefits/Higher Taxes
Tax rate 10.0% 10.0% 15.6% 15.6% 15.6% 15.6%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0%
Net Cost 5.1%      2.8%      9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1%
Option 3A: A stylized MB-type plan
Tax rate 10.0% 11.3% 11.3% 15.6% 15.6% 15.6% 42.9%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0%
Net Cost 5.1%      3.9%      4.4% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1%
Option 3B: A stylized IA-type plan
Tax rate 10.0% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 42.9%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 23.2% 23.2% 23.2%
Net Cost 5.1%      3.9% 6.1% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
Option 4: Making the trust fund permanent
Tax rate 10.0% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 42.9% 42.9%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0%
Net Cost 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1%
Option 5: A stylized PSA-type plan
Tax rate 10.0% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 5.6% 5.6% -55.2% -42.0%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5%
Net Cost 5.1% 5.5% 5.4% 5.3%      2.5%      2.5%
Notes: Repl.rate = replacement rate in period t (benefits/wages). Net Cost =
net cost of participating in social security for generation t = Tax rate in
period  t  -  present  value  of  benefits  in  period  t+1.  Trust  fund  =  End  of
generation  balance  as  share  of  annual  payroll.  See  the  appendix  for  the
underlying calculations.A-2
Table 2: Policy Options with Exogenous Interest Rates
Period/Generation: Memo: Trust Fund
t= -1 0 1 2 3 4 0 1
Option 1: Constant Taxes/Lower Benefits
Tax rate 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5% 20.5%
Net Cost 5.1% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8%
Option 2: Constant Benefits/Higher Taxes
Tax rate 10.0% 10.0% 15.6% 15.6% 15.6% 15.6%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0%
Net Cost 5.1%      5.1%      10.7% 10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
Option 3A: A stylized MB-type plan
Tax rate 10.0% 11.4% 11.4% 15.6% 15.6% 15.6% 43.6%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0%
Net Cost 5.1%      6.4%      6.4% 10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
Option 3B: A stylized IA-type plan
Tax rate 10.0% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 43.6%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 23.2% 23.2% 23.2%
Net Cost 5.1%      6.4% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8%
Option 4: Making the trust fund permanent
Tax rate 10.0% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 43.6% 43.6%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 29.2% 29.2% 29.2% 29.2%
Net Cost 5.1% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8%
Option 5: A stylized PSA-type plan
Tax rate 10.0% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 5.6% 5.6% -41.7% -31.7%
Repl.rate 32.0% 32.0% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5%
Net Cost 5.1% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9%      3.8%      3.8%
Notes: Repl.rate = replacement rate in period t (benefits/wages). Net Cost =
net cost of participating in social security for generation t = Tax rate in
period  t  -  present  value  of  benefits  in  period  t+1.  Trust  fund  =  End  of
generation  balance  as  share  of  annual  payroll.  See  the  appendix  for  the
underlying calculations.A-3
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